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MOTOR CARRIER LAW

UNREGULATED TRANSPORT IN THE HISTORY AND
ADMINISTRATION OF OKLAHOMA MOTOR
CARRIER LAW*
Larkin Warner**

Prices charged, services offered, products carried and many other
economic features of railroads and common and contract trucking firms
are subject to federal and state regulation. Although all railroads are
regulated, large segments of motor transport are subject to no regulation
except in regard to matters of safety. There is economic regulation neither
of passenger travel in private automobile nor the carriage of a shipper's
property in his own truck. Highway transport of agricultural commodities is exempt from federal economic regulation. For-hire trucking frequently exempted by states includes transport within municipalities,
operations of agricultural cooperatives, and the carrying of farm products,
fish, and newspapers.' In the last decade there has been increasing awareness and concern over the fact that regulated railroads and motor carriers
have been losing great amounts of potentially profitable traffic to private2 and exempt trucking operations. The interstate Commerce Commission has estimated that the share of intercity ton-miles hauled by common carriers declined from three-fourths in 1939 to two-thirds in 1959
and will continue to decline to around 60 per cent by 1970.s A report on
national transportation problems prepared recently for the United States
Senate Committee on Commerce observed this trend and concluded:
We frankly face a shift from a private public carrier-based
transport system to a private and exempt carrier-based system
along with the prospect of Government-owned railroad industry.
The latter would in all likelihood precipitate strict regulation of
all the competitors of the Government-owned railroads as it has
in other nations where nationalization of railroads has occurred
4

The relative decline of common carriage is alarming not only be*Work on this paper was facilitated by a grant from the Oklahoma State
University Research Foundation.
"Associate Professor of Economics, Oklahoma State University.
1 HARPER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF THE MOTOR TRUCKING INDUSTRY
BY THE STATES, 71, (1959).

2 The term "private" trucking as used in this paper refers to a shipper's hauling his own goods in his own or leased truck. There has been some tendency in the
past to use the adjective "private" to describe all trucking operations not involving
common carriage. Hence Oklahoma intrastate contract carriers are "Class B (Pri-

vate)" carriers. A better term might be "proprietary" trucking, but this is not
widely used.
a ICC 75th Ann. Rep. 9 (1961).

4 Senate Committee on Commerce, National Transportation Poliy, S. Rept.

445, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. 85 (1961).
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cause of the lurking 'specter of nationalization. Three conditions induce
uncertainty as to the extent to which this trend reflects a worsening in
the allocation of transport and other economic resources. (1) Common
carrier services and rates are subject to control by public agency and are
probably not able to react to changed market conditions as rapidly as
unregulated prices (2) Common carrier management has adhered with
uncommon tenacity to price and service policies developed under earlier,
less competitive conditions.6 (3) The very survival of the small shipper
who is precluded, solely by his smallness, from owning transportation
equipment may depend on the outcome of the battle between regulated
and non-regulated segments of the transport industry.
Conditions in Oklahoma do not present an exception to the national
trend toward private and unregulated trucking. To the extent that Oklahoma is at a disadvantage relative to neighboring states in matters relating to railroad rates, changes in the structure of the trucking industry
become particularly important. Moreover, the Oklahoma for-hire trucking industry is currently generating about $60 million in wage and salary
disbursements annually7 and slightly more than 1 per cent of the state's
total employment.s This study examines the history and administration of
Oklahoma motor carrier legislation in an attempt to identify how public
policy has affected the relationship between regulated and unregulated
segments of the state's intrastate motor carrier industry.0 It will be seen
that the two primary thannels though which this relationship is influenced
have been (1) the taxation of different classes of trucks and trucking
operations and (2) specific regulation of for-hire trucking.

THE FORMATION OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF REGULATION: 1923-39
The essentials of the statutory framework of Oklahoma motor car-

5 See

HILTON, TRANSPORTATION REGULATION AND PRIVATE CARRIAGE, IN
PRIVATE AND UNREGULATED CARRIAGE, Evanston, Illinois: Transportation Center

at Northwestern University 13-31 (1963).

6 A recent major study places heavy emphasis on noncompetitive pricing by
for-hire carriers as a cause for private trucking. O & HURTER, ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE TRUCK TRANSPORTATION, (1965). See also Wilson, The Effects of Value.
of-Service Pricing on Common Carriers, 63 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMIY

337 (1955).
7 U. S. Dep't of Commerce Office of Business Economics, Survey of Current
Business 21 (August, 1964).
8 Estimate derived from U. S. Dep't. of Commerce, County Business Patterns,
(Part 8A) (First Quarter, 1962).
9 Disregarding federal policy and focusing upon state regulation excludes
many issues extremely important to the Oklahoma shipping public. For a quick
view of the hazy status of feedrally exempt and non-exempt motor transport see
ICC, Gray Area of Transportation Operations, Statement No. 6010 (June, 1960).
See also the recent important decisions involving a Gutherie, Oklahoma firm 'in
which the scope of private truck-leasing agreements exempt from federal regulation was narrowed considerably. Oklahoma Furniture Manufacturing Co. et al.Investigation of Operations, 79 M. C. C. 403 (1959); Henry E. Drum v. United
States, 193 F. Supp. 275 (W. D. Okla. 1960); United States v. Henry E. Drum.

368 U.S. 370 (1962).
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tier regulation had all been shaped by 1939. Certain provisions in the
statutes can be understood only with reference to the events of the six.
teen year period following Oklahoma's first attempt to regulate the trucking industry. In particular, it is necessary to realize that much of today's
law developed at a time when economic regulation of motor carriers was
directly connected with a system of vehicle-mile taxation applying only
to regulated carriers.
FIRST REGULATION:

1923-28

Although Oklahoma's first motor vehicle licensing law was passed
in 1915, it was not until 1923 that the state legislature brought for-hire
motor transport under specific economic regulation. As in many other
states, early Oklahoma trucking legislation emerged from conditions
somewhat similar to those which had led to regulation of railroads in the
latter decades of the 19th century. Prominent among these conditions were
"ruinous" or "destructive" competition threatening carrier financial health,
and exhorbitant, discriminatory charges flowing from carrier monopoly
power. However, there were at least two very important differences between the origins of railroad and truck regulation. While the initial
stimulus for railroad regulation came from agrarian groups hostile toward
the railroads, truck regulation was promoted by railroads and large truckers
who saw regulation as a technique for rationalizing the transportation
industry.Y0 As a matter of fact, agrarian groups were opposed to motor
carrier regulation and frequently succeeded in obtaining exemptions from
regulation of for-hire transport of agricultural commodities. Moreover,
because trucks traveling over publicly-provided rights of way cause more
wear and tear than passenger cars, it became clear that truck operators
should bear a relatively greater share of the burden of highway finance.
Thus the first economic regulation of Oklahoma motor carriers included
a highway user tax.
The 1923 act entitled "Transportation by Motor Vehicles"" brought
motor carriers under regulation by the state's Corporation Commission.
The act defined the term "motor carrier" to include: ". . . any person,
firm....
operating any motor vehicle... upon any public highway for

the transportation of passengers or property for compensation between
fixed termini or over a regular route even though there may be periodic
or irregular departures from said termini or route."' 2 Vehicles operating
only in intracity business or not between incorporated towns were exempted from the provisions of the act. The act required that rates set by
motor carriers should be "just and reasonable."
10 See

HUDsoN

& CONsTANTmN, MOTOR TkANSPORTATION

at

46t-62

(1958).

11 OKLA. SESs. LAWs 1923, at 188.
12OKLA. SEss. LAWS 1923, ch. 113, S 1(a).
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. In order for a firm to offer a type of motor transport service covered
by the definition of "motor carrier," it had to seek from the Corporation
Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The Corporation Commission was given the power to attach to a certificate "such
terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may require."13 Certificates could be suspended, altered, revoked, or
amended by the Commission for good cause. The Commission was given
power to set up safety rules for trucks and to require motor carriers to
post public liability bonds.
All motor carriers were to pay a highway user tax of 2 mills per
vehicle-mile while carrying freight or passengers for hire. A weight restriction of 15,000 pounds per loaded vehicle was aimed at reducing
highway damage by trucks.
In 1923 there were 18,576 trucks licensed in Oklahoma. The following year, the first year the 1923 act' was in effect, truck registration
jumped to 27,047.14 During 1924 the Corporation Commission granted
121 certificates of public convenience and necessity. Since the trucking
firms of the 1920's were predominantly one- or two-vehicle operations, it may be presumed that a very small portion of the state's total
supply of truck transport was subject to the provisions of the act. Nevertheless, the Corporation Commission apparently attempted to take care
that no certificates were granted where there was no public convenience
and necessity, for in the same year it denied 72 applications.
Objection to the act of 1923 was immediately forthcoming. In Ex
parte Tindall' 5 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld emphatically the
right of the state to regulate motor carriers. The court argued that such
yegulation was proper exercise of a "plastic" police power and did not
deny persons' rights guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
THE Acr oF 1929
The 1923 legislation had several major defects. Since a great many
trucking operations were, not included in the definition of "motor carrie," regulation was incomplete. Private trucking was subject to no tax
,r regulation. The act was so worded that it apparently did not apply to
irregular-route carriers.
-The statute's treatment of contract trucking was also inadequate. In
1927 in Barbour v.Walker' 6 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that
a trucker hauling goods to Shawnee under contracts with five Oklahoma
13

OKLA.SSS. LAws 1923, ch. 113, S 4, at 189.

14 U. S. Bureau of Public Roads, Dep't. of Commerce, Highway Statistics,

Summary to 1955, at 24 (1957).
15 102 Okla. 192, 229 P. 125 (1925).
16 126 Okla.227, 259 P. 552 (1927).
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City firms was a "common carrier" under the definition of the act of
1923. In this case, the Oklahoma court wrestled with a United States Supreme Court decision declaring unconstitutional California's motor carrier
regulation statute. California law had placed contract carriers automatically
into the classification of common carrier by requiring them to obtain
certificates of public convenience and necessity. In Frost v. Railroad Commnission of California' the United States Supreme Court held that
forcing contract carriers to become common carriers violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the Oklahoma legislation of 1923 provided for
regulation of "motor carriers" having to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity, a question arose as to whether forcing the defendant to obtain a certificate was unconstitutional on the same basis as
the California statute. By using the term "motor carrier" rather than "common carrier," the Oklahoma statute did not force a contract carrier to
assume common carrier obligations. In spite of the fact that the Oklahoma
court was able to distinguish the Frost case,' 8 a question apparently remained concerning the constitutionality of a state's exercising its power
to regulate the use of its highways by requiring bona fide contract carriers
to obtain the same certificate of public convenience and necessity as common carriers.
Another defect which could prove extremely exasperating to the
shipping public was the Corporation Commission's lack of authority over
discontinuance of service. A certificate is a special and sometimes very
valuable privilege granted to private individuals by the state. If the state
guarantees, through the certificate, that a firm is safe from competition by
new firms, then a reasonable quid pro quo should protect the state and
its citizens from capricious cessation of a service which has been identified
as a public necessity.
. The act of 1929 entitled "Motor Vehicle Act Enforcement Fund"'1
established the basic "A-B-C" motor carrier classification which is still in
effect. The definition of "motor carrier" was broadened from its original
1923 form by excluding the requirement that service be between "fixed
termini or over a regular route."20 Thus the criterion for indentifying
'7 271 U. S. 583 (1926).
18 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma used two routes to distinguish Frost. (1)
The Frost decision had been premised on the California Supreme Court's finding
that the California motor carrier law had no relationship to regulation of the use
of the state's highways. Since the purpose of the Oklahoma legislation was regulation of the highways, Frost could not control. (2) Because defendant Walker had
five contracts (rather than one as in the Frost case), he was no longer a private
carrier and was merely using contracts as a guise to avoid regulation.
Barbour v. Walker was cited in support of the conclusion that after the Frost

case "courts ...held that there was no objection to requiring either permits or

certificates of convenience and necessity for contract carriers, provided the statutes
did not cast them into the category of common carriers." HALL, STATE CONTROL

'OF
BusINEss THROUGH CERTIFICATES OF CONVENIENCE AND NECEssITY 26
"(1947).
19 OKLA.SESS.LAWS 1929, ch. 253, at 351.
20 OKLA. SESS. LAWS 1923,ch. 113, § 1(b), at 188.
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"motor carrier" became simply the transportation of passengers or property
"for compensation." Motor carriers were then placed into three classes
depending upon the services in which they were engaged. Except for the
specification of common carriage, the "Class A" carrier was essentially
identical to the "motor carrier" of the 1923 legislation. 21 Class A carriers
were prohibited from discontinuing service without first obtaining permission from the Corporation Commission.
"Class C" included private truckers levying transport charges on their
customers, but excluded haulers of22 agricultural products from farm to
market and road-building materials.
The residual 'B" classification included "all other motor carriers not
operating as Class 'A' and 'C' motor carriers, whether as private carriers
or common carriers, of persons or property."23
A Class A carrier had to obtain from the Corporation Commission a
"certificate declaring that public convenience and necessity require [its]
operation." 24 Class B and C carriers were required to get permits to operate. The law stated no criteria by which the Commission should judge
whether or not to grant Class C permits. In its granting of Class B permits, the Commission could "attach to the exercise of the rights granted
by such permit, such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public
convenience and necessity require."25 The same section of the law also
contained a statement that "it shall not be necessary for any interstate
[Class B] carrier.., to make any showing of a Convenience and necessity."2 This wording, taken on its face, would seem to imply that intrastate Class B carriers were to be required to prove public convenience and
necessity. However, the Class B permit was called simply a "permit" and
not a "permit of public convenience and necessity." The specific exclusion
of interstate carrier from having to show convenience and necessity may
have been motivated by the fact that by 1929 it was well established that
such a requirement was an unconstitutional interference with interstate
commerce. 27

21 "Class "A" motor carriers, shall include all motor carriers operating as common carriers of persons, or property between fixed termini or over a regular route,
even though there be periodic of irregular departures from said termini or route."
OKLA. SEsS. LAws 1929, ch. 253, § I(b) (1), at 352.
22 "Class

'C motor carriers shall include all carriers which are operated by

owners for the transportation of their own property, goods or merchandise who

charge or collect from the consignee, purchaser, or recipient of such property, goods
or merchandise for transporting or delivering same, provided, however, the provisions of this Act shall not apply to transportation of livestock and farm products
in the raw state and trucks hauling road materials." OKLA. SaSS. LAWs 1929, ch

253,9 1(b) (3), at 352.
23 OKLA. SEss. LAws
24 OKLA. SESs. LAWS
25 OKLA. SEss. LAws

1929, ch. 253, § 1(b) (2), at 352.
1929, ch. 253, § 6, at 353.
1929, ch. 253, § 7, at 355 (emphasis added).

26 Ibid. (emphasis added). The 1929 legislation also exempted Class A interstate carriers from having to prove convenience and necessity, except when they

carried passengers or freight between points in Oklahoma. OKLA, SEss. LAws 1929,
ch. 253, § 6, at 354.
27 Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570 (1925).
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Class A and B carriers were required to post public liability bonds
and file tariffs. The Corporation Commission was given the power to
remove the liability bond requirements from Class C carriers. The act
was so worded that the same rule of "just and reasonable" ratemaking
apparently applied to all three classes.
The 1929 act expanded and revised the state's highway user
tax system Class A and B buses were subject to a graduated vehicle-mile
tax and a graduated set of registration fees, with buses with larger seating
capacities paying higher mileage tax rates and registration fees. Class A
carriers of freight had to pay a tax of 4 mills per vehicle-mile, while
Classes B and C carriers paid 5 mills. Two factors might explain this
peculiar difference in tax rates. First, the Class A carriers, unlike Classes
B and C, were also subject to registration fees graduated on the basis of
carrying capacity. Second, the Class A carriers' tax was computed in a
much more certain manner than that of the Class B carriers. Class A carrier mileage was "determined on the basis of the number of trips scheduled
per day and computed on the basis of thirty (30) days per calendar month
regardless of whether the motor vehicle carries out its schedule."28 The
taxation of B and C carriers was partially voluntary, for their mileage was
only to be calculated "while engaged in the transportation of property"
and their tax payment was to include a "verified report, showing the trips
made and the mileage traversed."2 9
THE COLLINS-DmTz-MORRIS CASE AND THE Acr OF 1933
The issue of what sort of transportation service was subject to regulation and taxation as Class C carriage was examined by the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma in 1932 in a case involving the trucking operations of
an Oklahoma City wholesale grocery firm. 30 The Collins-Dietz-Morris
Company owned two trucks which it used to deliver wholesale groceries
to retail stores outside the city limits of Oklahoma City. The firm used
two techniques for billing customers receiving goods delivered in its
trucks. For some shipments no specific charge for transportation was
levied against the retailer; for others a specific delivery charge was included. The issue before the court was whether or not the Corporation
Commission had ruled correctly when it had held that the Collins-DietzMorris trucking operations were of a Class C nature. This issue was particularly important to the firm, because if it was not a Class C carrier it
would not have to pay the 5 mill per vehicle-mile user tax.
In ruling on whether or not the operations involved transportation
ch. 253, §9, at 356.
29 OKLA. Sass. LAws 1929, ch. 253, §9, at 357. When a trucking firm chal28 OKLA. SEss. LAws 1929,

lenged this tax differential as discriminatory, the U. S. District Court upheld the
tax on the grounds that the cost of collection would be greater in the cases of "B"
and "C" carriers. Roadway Express v. Murray, 60 F. 2d 293 (W. D. Okla. 1932).
30 Collins-Dietz-Morris Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 154 Okla., 121,
7 P.2d 123 (1932).
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for "compensation," the court differentiated between the two types of
billing used by the firm. If there is no specific charge for delivery, held
the court, then the cost of transport is overhead borne by all the firm's
customers and does not involve transport for "compensation." However,
when the firm made a specific charge for the transportation service, it
was receiving compensation for transportation and was therefore subject
to the mileage tax as a Class C carrier.
The court then took the trouble to point out some limitations to the
scope of the Corporation Commission's authority over Class C carriers.
Completely overlooking the 1929 law's lack of clarity in this matter,81 the
court stated:
An examination of the act discloses that class "C" motor
carriers as defined therein are not common carriers and are not
subject to the regulation of the corporation commission as to
rates, fares, charges and classifications. The schedules, services
and accounts of class "C"motor carriers are not subject to regulation or supervision by the corporation commission, the authority of the corporation commission over class "C"motor carriers
being limited to the regulation of the use of the public highways
by class32"C" motor carriers under the restrictions contained in
the act.
The grocery firm also charged that the exemption from Class C of
road materials and farm-to-market transport of farm products was contrary to the state constitution's prohibitions against discriminatory taxation. The Court, however, held the exemptions constitutional. It noted
sufficient basis for the exemptions in the fact that hauling farm produce
and road materials does not contribute to the congestion of inter-city highways to the same degree as other forms of truckingPt
After the Collins-Dietz-Morris decision, any firm shipping in its own
trucks could avoid taxation as a Class C carrier by never identifying transportation charges on invoices. The 1933 Oklahoma Legislature attempted
to close this loophole. The definition of "motor carrier was broadened
by adding the phrase "or for commercial purposes" to the provision of
the 1929 act, so that "motor carrier" now included firms engaged in
31 Holding Collins-Dietz-Morris operations involving specific transportation
charges subject to taxation as Class C carriage could have set up the following
chain of reasoning: (1) Class C operations are, of course, those of a "motor carrier" as defined in the act; (2) The act prescribes that "all charges made by any
motor carrier for any intra-state service... shall be just and reasonable ... ;" (3)
Therefore, charges levied by Collins-Dietz-Morris upon its customers are subject to
regulations by the Corporation Commission.
82 Supra note 30, at 131.
33 This interpretation was reaffirmed in Pure Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 179 Okla. 479, 66 P.2d.1097 (1936) and Walde v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 188 Okla. 142, 106 P.2d 821 (1940).
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"transportation of passengers or property for compensation or for commercial purposes.,,
The scope of exemptions from Class C regulation was expanded and
clarified, and several agricultural commodities were specifically listed as
exempt. 5 The 1933 law also revised the state's vehicle-mile user tax on
motor carriers of property. The act of 1929 had set up flat rates of 4 mills
per vehicle-mile for Class A carriers and 5 mills per vehicle-mile for
Classes B and C carriers. Under the new provisions all three classes wege
subject to the same schedule of taxes. However, the tax rate varied directly
with vehicle weight. There were five weight classifications, and the rate
ranged from 4 to 10 mills per vehicle-mile.
FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF PR vATE TRUCK STATUS:
THE PURE OIL CASES
In spite of the action taken in 1933, the Class C loophole had not
been closed completely. After the 1933 revision, the Oklahoma Tax Commission sought to tax as Class C carriers the trucks owned and operated
by petroleum producers to haul oil field equipment8 0 Since such-equipment was rather abundant in Oklahoma, considerable tax revenue was
involved.

The Pure Oil Company challenged the Tax Commission's ruling that
it was engaged in Class C transport. In 1935, a divided Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled in Pure Oil v. CornishU that Pure's trucks were not
Class C carriers. In so ruling, the court determined that Pure's hauling oil
field equipment did not involve transportation "for commercial purposes"
or "in furtherance of any private commercial enterprise." The adjective
"commercial" in the Act of 1933 was held to refer to "buying, selling and
exchange in goods, wares and merchandise in the general sales or traffic
of our own markets."38 This was contrasted with the "industrial pursuit"
in which Pure was engaged. The court noted the ambiguity in the word34 OxLA. SEAss. LAws 1933, ch. 156, §1, at 354.
35 "Class 'C' motor carriers shall include all other persons, firms or corporations,... engaged in the transportation of property in furtherance of any private

commercial enterprise and not operating .

.

. as a common carrier for hire, pro-

vided, however, the provisions of this Act shall not apply to transportation of live.
stock and farm products in the raw state, logs and rough lumber and which raw
state shall include cotton, whether in the seed or ginned, cotton seed, hay, whether
loose or baled, corn, wheat, oats, and all other articles produced on the farm, from

farm to market, nor to trucks hauling road materials." OKLA. SEss. LAWs 1933, ch.
156, 51, at 354-55.
36 In 1933 the task of collecting the mileage tax was placed in the hands of
the Oklahoma Tax Commission. OKLA. Sass. LAws 1933; ch. 156, 53, at 358. Administration of the granting of permits and certificates remained the job of the
Corporation Commission. At the time the Tax Commission was established in 1931,
no provision was made for shifting the collection of the tax from the Corporation
Commission.
37 174 Okla. 615, 52 P.2d 832 (1935).
38 Id. at 618, 52 P.2d at 834.
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ing of the Class C provisions of the statute and opined that if the legislature had wanted oil field equipment transport covered by the act, it would
have said so.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Riley points out that the majority
gave an extremely narrow definition to the term "commerce." The issue
is similar to that of the scope to be given to the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. Justice Riley supported the broad interpretation given by Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.30The dissenting justice conduded:
The goal of its [Pure's] endeavor, be it production of natural
resources or industrial pursuits, is profit. Its use of the highway
is "in furtherance" of this. Consequently, by the act, the Legislature sought justly to tax it for the use and upkeep of the public
highway appropriated to its private commercial use.40
The majority's narrow interpretation of "commerce" hower, should be
viewed in the light of what was happening at the national level. Six
months before this case was decided, the United States Supreme Court
had used a narrow definition of "commerce" to strike down the National
Industrial Recovery Act.41 Other parts of Roosevelt's New Deal were
soon to crumble on the same basis.
Before the first Pure Oil decision had been handed down, the 1935
Oklahoma legislature had amended the 1933 act in an attempt to clarify
further the nature of Class C carriage. The new legislation defined "commercial purposes" to include "all undertakings entered into for private
gain or compensation, including all industrial pursuits, whether such
undertakings
involve the handling or dealing in commodities for sale or
42
otherwise."
The Pure Oil Company again challenged the application of the statute to its operations. This time, however, the issues had to do solely with
whether or not the legislation was contrary to the Constitution of Oklahoma.43 Most of the questions posed by Pure had already been treated by
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Ex Parte Tindall" and Collins-DietzMorris.45 The court saw no reason to depart from its findings in those
cases and thus ruled against Pure. The oil firm's appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States was dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question.46
39 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
40 Pure Oil v. Cornish, 174 Okla. 615, 620, 52 P.2d 832, 837 (1935).
41 A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
42 OKLA. SEss. LAws 1935, ch. 20, art. §1, at 28.
43 Pure Oil v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 179 Okla. 479, 66 P.2d 1097

(1936).
44

102 Okla. 192, 229 P. 125 (1925).

45 154 Okla. 121, 7 P.2d 123 (1932).
46

Pure Oil v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 635 (1937).
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REPEAL OF THE MILEAGE TAx

During the 1930's, much controversy over the nature of Class C
trucking developed because of uncertainty over the application of Oklahoma's vehicle-mile tax. If the Class C label had any significance at all,
it was for the purpose of levying the mileage tax rather than for regulation-in spite of the fact that the label was clearly part of a regulatory
framework. By 1939, however, it had become clear that the mileage tax
was extremely difficult to enforce and that for many carriers full payment
of the tax appeared to be primarily voluntary. Less than one-third of the
trucks licensed in the state paid any mileage tax whatsoever. A state legislator estimated that only about half of the mileage tax due was actually
collected. 47 Furthermore, it was doubtful that a true record of mileage was
always kept by those paying the tax. Evasion was a great deal easier for
Class B and Class C carriers who kept their own mileage records than for
Class A carriers whose tax was computed on the basis of scheduled trips
along regular routes.
Uneven enforcement must have been particularly irritating to some
truckers, for state revenues from the vehicle-mile tax were not inconsequential. During the period 1933-39, annual receipts for the tax rose from
less than $200,000 to slightly over $1,500,000, or about 3 per cent of
Oklahoma's total tax revenue.48 Much of these increased receipts were
derived from interstate truckers passing through the "ports of entry"
which existed near the state's borders from 1935 through 1939.11
The 1939 legislature repealed the vehicle-mile tax and substituted a
uniform system of higher license fees for almost all of the state's trucks.50
The system of registration fees varying directly with vehicle weight was
upgraded to provide additional revenues and the vehicle-mile tax on buses
was retained. Eliminating the truck vehicle-mile tax was criticized on the
ground that a system of taxation relying entirely upon registration fees
discriminated against the truck owner who seldom used the highway in
favor of truckers regularly using the highway.5 These objections had been
at least partially overcome by earlier provisions in the licensing law providing special treatment for farm trucks and reduced license fees for older
trucks. Trucks "used exclusively for farm use ... and not for commercial
or industrial purposes" along with trucks "used exclusively for the transportation of logs, ties, stave bolts, and posts direct from the forest to mill,
first market or railroad shipping points" were subject to slightly higher
initial license fees, but the license fees decreased at a much more rapid
rate with age of the vehicle than was the case for other trucks. 2
47 Daily Oklahoman, April 12, 1939, p. 2.
4S Okla. Tax Commission Fourth Biennial Rep. at 286 (1940).
40 Okla. Tax Commission Third Biennial Rep. at 23 (1938).
50 OKLA. SEss. LAws 1939, ch. 50, at 279-306.
51 Daily Oklahoman, op. cit. supra note 47, at 2.
52 OKLA. SEss. LAws 1939, ch. 50, at 289. (It is interesting to note that in
1962 the cost of licensing farm vehicles remained at its 1939 level, whereas licensing costs for other trucks has risen between $25.00 and $30.00.)
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RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES REGARDING
THE SCOPE OF REGULATION
There were no major changes in the Oklahoma motor carrier regula-

don statutes between 1939 and 1965.3 The 1965 legislature attacked the
problem that coverage of regulation was at the same time too narrow and
too broad. Regulation of for-hire trucking applied only to the hauling of
goods through or between two or more incorporated cities or towns."
This gap in regulation had become more apparent as the development of
the interstate highway system permitted a greater number of useful routes
which bypass towns completely, or touch only one incorporated place. On
the other hand, while interstate carriers of agricultural products are not
subject to federal economic regulation,5 5 Oklahoma exempted only farmto-market trucking.56 Already hampered by insufficient funds, the Corporation Commission's enforcement program was faced with an insurmountable problem in its attempt to regulate agricultural truckers.6 7
In the 1965 legislature's House Bill 922,r s the motor carrier statutes
were amended so that economic regulation now applies to all motor carriers using the public highways and not operating in strictly local business.
In the same piece of legislation, carriers of unprocessed agricultural commodities were placed in the same category as purely interstate carriers.
Such carriers do not have to prove convenience and necessity and may be
issued permits without public hearings. Although the definition of unprocessed agricultural products is not spelled out in the act, it may be
anticipated that the federal pattern will be adopted.

OPERATING AUTHORITY BEFORE THE CORPORATION COMMISSION AND THE COURTS
There is no regulatory restriction concerning the sort of services and
53 Minor changes in the law since 1939 relate to the displaying on trucks of
evidence of Corporation Commission Operating Authority (OKLA. SEss. LAWS
1961, ch. 7, at 309.), clarification of the exemption of farm-to-market trucking
(OKLA. Sass. LAws 1961, ch. 7, at 309), clarification of the exemption of farmto-market trucking (OKLA. Sass. LAws 1943, ch. 7, at 120.), and the revocation
of Class A passenger certificates when a bus line is shut down because of a strike
(OKLA. SEss. LAws 1953, ch. 76, at 209).

54 47 OKLA. STAT. § 161(d) (1961). This policy was reaffirmed with re-

spect to the transport of crude oil and similar "deleterious" products in 1963. OKLA,
SEss. LAws 1963, ch. 19, at 404.

55 Campbell, Agricultural Exemptions from Motor Carrier Regulations, 36

LAND ECON. 14 (1960), and Linnenberg, The Agricultural Exemptions in Inter-

state Trucking: Mend Them or End- Them? 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 139
(1960).
56 47 OKLA. STAT. § 161 (1961).
57 In the summer of 1962, the field enforcement staff of the Corporation Com

mission consisted of seven full-time and four part-time employees operating primarily from weight stations.
158 Enrolled House Bill No. 992, An Act Relating to Motor Vehicles, (June,
1965).-
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routes which a shipper can provide for himself in his own "Class C" or
otherwise unregulated truck. A rational shipper would undertake private
trucking only after consideration of alternatives provided by for-hire carriers. Thus examination of the regulation of operating rights of carriers
may provide some indication of the limitations to services, rates and
routes affecting decisions of potential and actual private truckers.
THE IDENTIFICATION OF EXEMPT TRANSPORT

Although the statutory framework of Oklahoma motor carrier regulation has been relatively stable for the past two decades, the problem of
defining what transport is and is not subject to economic regulation has
by no means been solved. Early attempts at state regulation left the definitions of exempt and private transport extremely unclear; it should not
be surprising that there still exists a "gray area" even after considerable
clarification during the 1930's. One symptom of this was the apparently
widespread illicit passenger transportation operations of "travel bureaus"
9
helping travelers find rides with each other during the 1930's and 4 0 's.0
In 1945 the Oklahoma Supreme Court made it absolutely clear that
no economic regulation was to be applied to Class C carriers. In Beverly v.
Elam6 the court held that the 1929 motor carrier act did not require the
issuing of a permit except upon a showing of public convenience and
necessity. Although the court's reasoning in this case is open to criticism,6 '
the decision nevertheless gives judicial sanction to the lack of the use of
the Class C permit. Corporation Commission annual reports list the granting of no Class C permits after 1935. The Beverly v. Elam decision also
made it clear that Class C carriers were not required to post public liability
bonds-as was required of Classes A and B.
Recently there has been some slight activity in the courts relating to
the problem of defining private and exempt transport. In 1957 the Okla59 See Herringjv. State, 60 Okla. Grim. 449, 64 P.2d 921 (1936); Jack Herring v. State, 68 Oka Grim. 32, 95 P.2d 128 (1939); and Hudgins v. State, 75
Okla. Grim. 446, 133 P.2d 231 (1943).
60 196 Okla. 15, 162 P.2d 180 (1945).
61 The court was quite explicit in its interpretation of the role of the Class C
permit. '"rheonly permit required of carriers under the original (1923) act was a
certificate of convenience and necessity, and there is no provision under the 1929
act for a permit to any carrier therein classified and defined except upon showing
of convenience and necessity." (Id. at 17, 162 P.2d at 182). In reaching this conclusion the court disregarded as "apparently inadvertent" sections of the law requiring a filing fee of Class C permit holders 47 OKLA. STAT. § 166 (1941) and
requiring permit holders to file liability insurance policies or bonds with the Commission 47 OKLA. STAT. S 169 (1941). The court also disregarded the fact that
the 1929 legislation set up the "C'"classification in conjunction with its attempt to
collect the state's vehicle mile tax. Further evidence of the rarified atmosphere in
which this decision must have been written is the fact that three years earlier ,the
Corporation Commission adopted the practice (which has followed ever since) of
not requiring evidence of public convenience and necessity of Class B permit holders operating as contract carriers. See 1942 Okla. Corp. Comm. Ann. Rep. Order
No. 15, 639, Rule 4(e), at 262.
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homa Supreme Court refused to rule on the matter of whether or not the

Corporation Commission had jurisdiction over a farmers' cooperative
hauling products for its own members.62 Central Oklahoma Milk Producers Association applied to the Commission for a Class B permit for its
trucking operations. The application was protested by the Oklahoma Milk
Haulers Association, a group of for-hire milk truckers. In what may have
been an attempt to avoid a possible unfavorable ruling, the cooperative
withdrew its application "for the reason that the Commission did not have
03
jurisdiction over a co-operative operating solely for its own members."
The Commission dismissed the case and the for-hire milk haulers appealed
the dismissal to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. The court ruled that
since there is no specific statutory provision for appeal from a Corporation
Commission ruling regarding a Class B permit (there is such a provision
for Class A permits), any judgment on appeal would have to rest on the
court's general constitutional powers to review Corporation Commission
decisions appealed by "any party affected or... any person deeming himself aggrieved."6 4 Since the milk haulers were not directly involved in the
application, they had no right to appeal, and the court refused to rule.
The Corporation Commission field staff is engaged in apprehending
illegal for-hire motor transport in need of operating authority. Frequently
'violations are dear-cut, and the law-breaking ceases when the carrier obtains appropriate operating authority (usually Class B).
CRITERIA UsEI IN GRANTING "A" AND "B" OPERATING AUTHORITY
The Corporation Commission and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
have handed down numerous rulings describing criteria by which Class A

and Class B operating authority applications are to be judged. Some inadequacies in the statutory framework of Oklahoma motor carrier regulation appear in the uncertain relation between the law and practice of
granting operating authority.
Legal Definitions of "Convenience and Necessity."-As early as 1926
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma attempted to define standards by which
to identify "convenience and necessity" in motor carrier cases. In 1925
the Corporation Commission granted a certificate to operate interurban
bus service between Chickasha and Waurika in competition with the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company. The railroad appealed
the issue to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, which in turn directed the
Commission to disallow the petition on the grounds that no evidence was
presented to the effect that service offered by the railroad was inadequate. 5 While the court felt that some travelers might find such bus
service a "convenience," it would be unlikely that any would find it a
"necessity." The court then proceeded to define "necessity." Clearly, said
the court, it does not involve a service which is "essential or absolutely indispensable." Necessity would be proved if "the motor vehicle service
62 Application of Central Oklahoma Milk Producers Association, 312 P.2d 500
(Okla. 1957).
63 Id. at 501.
64 Id. at 502.
65 Chicago, R.L & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 123 Okla. 190, 252 P. 849 (1926).
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would be such an improvement of the existing mode of transportation as
to justify or warrant the expense of making the improvement."66 To the
individual businessman, expected profit is the criterion by which an "expense" is "justified" or "warranted." Thus the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
directed the Corporation Commission to use broader criteria than mere individual profit. Evidence was required showing that "the inconvenience of
the public occasioned by the lack7 of motor carrier transportation is so
great as to amount to a necessity."
The Rock Island continued to battle the growth of bus transport and
brought another certification case to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in
1927.Ps The certificate in question was for a bus line from Enid to El
Reno. This time, however, there was some evidence presented before the
Corporation Commission that such service was needed. The incompleteness of the railroad's time schedule was a particular problem for travelers
from Enid. Though the court noted that the evidence presented by both
parties was "somewhat unsatisfactory..... rather meager, and consists
principally of generalities,"6 9 it nevertheless upheld the Commission's
granting of the certificate. The court reviewed its proper role in examining decisions of the Commission. Artide 9, Section 22 of the Oklahoma
Constitution at that time required that an appeal from a Corporation Comnission decision must overcome a prima facie presumption of the order's
being "reasonable, just and correct." The court pointed out that even if it
thought the order "unwise," that would not be sufficient reason to set it
aside as "unjust, unreasonable, or arbitrary."70 'There being some evidence
reasonably tending to support the order of the Corporation Commission
...we are unable to say that the prima facie presumption of the reasonableness and justness of the order . . . has been overcome."7 1 This is a

position from which the court seldom deviates in motor carrier operating
rights cases, even though constitutional provisions regulating appeals from
Corporation Commission decisions are no longer the same as in 1927.72
Id. at 191-92, 252 P. at 851.
Id. at 192, 252 P. at 851.
CS Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 126 Okla. 48, 258 P. 874 (1927).
69 Id. at 50, 258 P. at 876.
70 Id. at 52, 258 P. at 877.
71 Id. at 53, 258 P. at 878.
72 In 1941, the legislature exercised its constitutional authority to change certain provisions of the constitution relating to appeals from Corporation Commission decisions. The prima facie presumption of reasonableness was deleted from
article 9, Section 22. A new Article 9, Section 20, directed the court to sustain
Commission orders if they are supported by substantial evidence. Oddly enough, in
a 1957 decision, the court referred to the old Article 9, Section 22, as though it
were the current provision. Mistletoe Express Service v. Corporation Commission,
316 P.2d 865, 869 (Okla., 1957). Instances in which the Commission's granting
of operating rights has been upheld in the face of appeals by competing carriers
include, Ibid.; Yellow Transit Co. v. State, 198 Okla. 229, 178 P.2d 83 (1947);
Holzbierlein v. State, 197 Okla. 509, 172 P.2d 1007 (1946); Oklahoma Transportation Co. v. State, 198 Okla. 246, 177 P.2d 93 (1947); Associated Motor Carriers, Household Division v. Corporation Commission, 323 P.2d 337 (Okla.
1958); Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. State, 378 P.2d 311 (Okla. 1963); and
Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. State, 386 P.2d 1021 (Okla. 1963). A prinicipal
exception occurs in Groendyke Transport v. State, 258 P.2d 670 (Okla. 1953).
66
07
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However, the court held that its 1926 definition of "necessity" of
common carrier service was ambiguous and in need of revision. A new
definition was presented.
As used in this connection, "necessity" means a public need,
without which the public is inconvenienced to the extent of being handicaped in the pursuit of business or wholesome pleasure
or both, without which the people generally of the community
are denied, to their detriment, that which is enjoyed by other
people generally, similarly situated.73
Although this is the definition which is still controlling, it is obvious that
the 1927 court hardly overcame the problem of ambiguity. Criticizing the
1926 standard, the court argued that the first telephone would not have
been a public necessity under such a definition. The court's later standard
is subject to exactly the same criticism as its earlier one. Qualitative and
quantitative improvements in Oklahoma's transportation network must
involve development of service which is superior to that "enjoyed by other
people generally, similarly situated." This might suggest that Oklahoma's
public convenience and necessity requirement has tended to be applied on
a case by case, pragmatic basis.
Rules Defining the Scope of Class B Authority.-The Oklahoma
Class B intrastate motor carrier classification is a catch-all covering car.riers that are neither private (Class C) nor regular route common (Class
A). Two Corporation Commission orders issued in 1942 and still in effect
with only slight modification clarify the techniques by which Class B
permits are granted.7 4 The orders split the "B" classification into "Class B
Common" and "Class B Private (Contract)." In the first of the two orders,
the Commission set forth some criteria by which it would judge whether
or not to allow the various Class A and B services. The same standard of
public convenience and necessity was apparently to be applied to both
Class A and Class B Common carriers.7 5 However, Class B contract carriers were specifically exempted from the need to show public convenience
and necessity. 6 In 1961 the Commission set forth standards by which to
evaluate applications for Class B contract permits. Such permits are now
only to be issued if the applicant shows three conditions: "(1) the existence of a bona fide contract for furnishing service; (2) that the service
73 Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 126 Okla. 48, 50-51, 258 P. 874, 877
(1927).
74 1942 OkLa. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep. orders No. 15,639 and No. 15,684,

at 259, 279. (These orders also appear in each of the Commission's annual reports
.since 1942.)

7r "The Commission, in all such cases of applications to operate Class A or
Class B intrastate common carrier service, after a public hearing, will issue said
certificate or permit as prayed for, or refuse to issue the same, or issue it for the
partial exercise only of said privilege sought, and will attach (sic) to the exercise
ofthe rights granted by such certificate or permit such terms and conditions as in
its judgment the public convenience and necessity may require . . ." 1942 Okla.
Corp. Comm'n. Ann.
Rep. Order No. 15,639, Rule 4 (c), at 261.
I6 Rule 4 (e), at 262.
Id.,
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31

proposed is not such as could be reasonably furnished by existing common
carrier service; and (3) that 77such a permit would not jeopardize the existing common carrier service.
The second of the 1942 orders attempts to protect the property rights
of Class A carriers by limiting the scope of those Class B Common operatdns between points served by Class A carriers to the hauling of goods
on a specified list, and any other goods requiring special transport equipment or rapid shipment unavailable from Class A carriers. 78 As a matter
of fact, many of the goods on the specified list require specialized transport equipment. Among the more important products on this list are livestock, sand and gravel, bulk petroleum, oil field equipment, household
goods, and grain. There are no similar limitations placed on Class B carriage of goods between points not served by Class A carriers.
Class A and Class B Common carriers were to be required to file
with the Commission tariffs showing actual rates; the contract carriers
had to file copies of contracts showing minimum rates.7 9 Neither Class A
and B, nor contract and common shipments could be mixed in the same
truck on a single trip.8 0 Contract carriers except haulers of farm products
were prohibited from handling shipments for more than three contracting
Vhippers on a single truck-trip.81 This helps explain why the great majority of Class B permits are for common rather than contract carriage. A
highly specialized carrier can be relatively sure that being an irregular
route common carrier involves a common carrier obligation that is more
nominal than real; such a carrier does, however, gain flexibility which
would enable him to solicit additional business when his primary shippers
do not provide him with enough traffic to operate at full capacity.
"Convenience and Necessity" in Practice.-TableI presents a quantitative indication of the Corporation Commission's operating authority
policy for selected years. Note that a much larger number of authorities
have been granted for Class B than for Class A operations. Although the
annual reports of the Corporation Commission cease distinguishing between Class B and A authorities after 1955, Commission staff advises that
the more recent pattern would still consist primarily of Class B authorities.
Supply-demand characteristics of the more specialized and less "common"
class B operations would tend to indicate why such authorities are so
numerous in comparison to those of Class A. A small truck firm which
1961 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep. Order No. 44,935, at 396, 398.
1942 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep. Order No. 15,684, Rule 2, at 28990. The 1942 order was worded in a manner such that it might have appeared
that Class A Carriers had no priority regarding operating authority over Class B
carriers in the case of goods requiring "extraordinarily expeditious and rapid transportation." Id., at 290. In 1952 the Corporation Commission construed the original
wording to give Class A carriers priority for goods requiring rapid shipment as
well as for goods needing special equipment. 1952 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann.
Rep. Order No. 25,639, at 323.
79 1942 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep. Order No. 15,684, Rule 3, at 290,
80 Id., Rules 27, 28, 30, at 294-295.
81 Id., Rule 29 at 295.
77
78
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could not possibly provide service required of a regular route common
carrier may nevertheless be able to fill adequately the specialized needs of
particular shippers.
A marked trend increase in authorities granted in recent years is also
shown in Table 1. This is evidently a result of the growth of Oklahoma's
economy, combined with more vigorous law enforcement and the Commission's attempt to dear a previously jammed docket of applications.
TABLE 1

Decisions on Applications for Motor Carrier Permits Before the Corporation

Commission of the State of Oklahoma for Selected Fiscal Years, 1925-60
CLASS
CLASS
CLASS
YEAR
C"
..

(FISCAL)
1925
Granted
Dismissed
1930
Granted
Dismissed
1935
Granted
Dismissed
1940
Granted
Dismissed
1945
Granted
Dismissed
1950
Granted
Dismissed
1953
Granted
Dismissed
1955
Granted
Dismissed
1956
Granted
Dismissed
1957
Granted
Dismissed
1958
Granted
Dismissed
1959
Granted
Dismissed
1960
Granted
Dismissed

TOTAL

or denied

"A"

"B" .

210

........ ........ ........

100

...........

273

........ ........

or denied

50

or denied

........

....
...

....
...

761
10

42
7

181
3

or denied

225
1

12
0

2131
1

........
........

or denied

402
9

34
4

3681
5

.......
........

or denied

272
10

19
1

2531
9

........
........

or denied

149
2

16
1

1331
1

........
........

or denied

174
13

13
0

1611
13

........
.......

or denied

31713
38

28813
or denied

36
34713

or denied

47

47313
or denied

82

........

........

538
02

........

........

................

......

...............

........ ........ .......
........

........

.......

.

........

........

..

..

........
....

........

........ ........
.
.....

48413

................

or denied

189
........ ........ ........
I Granted in part applications are included: 1950, 235; 1953, 51; 1955, 109;
1956, 95; 1957, 36; 1958, 18; 1959, 7; 1960, 8.
2 Class "C" dropped from class classifications
3 No class classification
Source: Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, Annual Report, selected years.
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RATES AND MILEAGE IN RELATION TO OPERATING RIGHTS

Pricing techniques to be used by Class A and B carriers are set forth
in the Commission's Order No. 15,684 (1942).82 The order includes a
list of class rates applicable to Class A carriers and those Class B Common
carriers hauling between points where there is no Class A service. Schedules of weights and rates for specific commodities hauled by Class B Common carriers are also presented.
Rates.-Order No. 15,684 does not make clear the extent to which
minimum or actual rates were being prescribed. Rule 14 reads83as though
the Class A rate schedules present actual rates to be charged. Rule 24
refers to the Class B Common carrier schedules as "specific minimum
weights and rates."8 4 There could, of course, be some doubt as to whether
the adjective "minimum" was intended to modify "rates." In the context
of the general economic conditions prevailing at the time Order No. 15,684 was handed down, it would appear that the Commission was dealing
with actual rather than minimum rates. Worry over maintenance of minimum prices and the prevention of ruinous competition had passed from
the American scene by the summer of 1942; the concern was rather one
of general price control and the prevention of the inflationary byproducts
of a wartime economy s5
Neverthless, a 1959 Commission decision made clear the fact the
15,684 rate schedules are now being construed as minimum rates. Groendyke Transports, Inc., applied for permission to quote a Class B Common
carrier rate on oil products which was below the rate listed in the 1942
order. A special case of high-volume, round trip shipments of petroleum
products between Ardmore and Grandfield was involved, and the Commission permitted the rate to go into effect on a trial basis.8 6 The Commission, however, exhibited general reluctance to permit further reductions by stating: "We are, however, of the opinion that the minimum rate
established in 1942 is low enough when considering the increased cost of
Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep. at 279.
83 "The rates prescribed in Appendix A . . shall be known and treated as
82 1942

the 1st class, or column 100 rates, and shall be applicable between origin and
destination via the shortest route shown in any motor carrier's mileage tariff between points of said carrier's authorized route... " Id. at 292.
84 d.at 294.
85 Three months after Order No. 15,684 was issued, the Commission authorized an increase in rates charged by Class B Common carriers of cottonseed, peanuts and soybeans. In this matter, the Commission stated that the original Order
No. 15,684 rate schedule on these products was so low that "trucks could no longer

transport these commodities." 1943 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep.; Journal Entry

No. 3758, at 426. Moreover, the petition for this increase came from cottonseed
mills, rather than truckers. Such proceedings would scarcely have been necessary if
the 15,684 rates had been merely minimum rates.
86 1960 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep., Order No. 41,111, at 321. See also
1960 Okla. Corp Comm'n. Ann. Rep., Journal Entry No. 6288, at 562.
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operation
applied in the normal pattern of petroleum products transporta87
tion
On the basis of the Grandfield rate case, it now appears that the
Commission's general rate level policy-at least in regard to Class B Common carriers-involves some sort of a concept which might be labeled a
.zone of reasonableness." The Commission took note of the fact that it
had authorized three general increases on petroleum products since 1942,
but that carriers had not always raised rates to the levels authorized. Thus
it would appear that the 1942 order set forth minimum reasonable rates,
and that maximum reasonable rates are to be found in the authorized increases since 1942. One apparent exception to this "zone" involves the
Commission's prescription of -actual rates for the movement of household
goods.88
In June, 1962 the Corporation Commission approved on a trial basis
a rather unique technique for quoting common carrier rates.80 As in the
Grandfield rate case, charges for hauling petroleum products by the Groendyke trucking firm were in issue. The rate-making concept used was that
of so-called "dedicated service." In this particular arrangement, Groendyke
held itself out to serve all customers, but published a tariff indicating that
it stood willing to haul petroleum products anywhere in Oklahoma for a
given customer utilizing a single truck for a period of six consecutive
days. The charge for this six day "dedicated service" was set at $720 plus
20 cents per mile for aech mile in excess of 2400. The Commission took
note of the erosion of the for-hire petroleum transport business to private
carriage and the inability of carriers using existing rate structures to stimulate shippers to cooperate to achieve economical use of transport equipment. However, the Commission directed that the arrangement be cancelled in March, 1963. 90
Mileage.-The rate and weight of the product carried must always
be combined with distance of shipment in determining actual shipper
charges. In 1942 the Commission directed that Class B carriers should
calculate mileage on the basis of actual short-line highway distances.0 '
However, Class A carrier mileage normally was to be identical to railroad
mileage betwen origin and destination. Class A carriers could use actual
highway mileage only when it was less than railroad mileage by 10 per
cent or more. 2 The purpose of such Class A mileage calculation apparently was to permit Class A truckers to follow the price leadership of the
railroads.
Although this technique of mileage calculation did not place Class
87

1960 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep., Order No. 41,111, at 324.

88 1961 Oka. Corp. Comm'n Ann. Rep., Order No. 43,016, at 304.
89 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Order No. 48,971, (typewritten copy).
00 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Order No. 51,047, (typewritten copy).
91 1942 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep., Order No. 15,684, Rule 13(b) at
292.

92

Id. Rule 13 (a) at 292.
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A carriers at an appreciable disadvantage relative to Class B carriers
(whose ability to compete had been restricted via operating rights), it
undoubtedly served to make private transportation more desirable for
some shippers. When the private shipper calculates the actual or potential cost of operating his own vehicle, he never bases his mileage on that
of the railroads. In September, 1958, at the request of the common carrier truckers, the Commission permitted Class A mileage to be calculated according to short-line highway distance.9 3 Six months later the
Commission gave temporary approval to the Class A carriers' use of a
system of group rates for origins and destinations in the state.94 This
system later received permanent approval.95
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY: PROBLEMS
AND POSSIBILITIES 6
The preceding review of the history and administration of Oklahoma
motor carrier regulation has indicated that taxation, the nature and scope
of regulation of operating authority, and rate policy have played primary
1959 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep., Order No. 38,035, at 327.
04 1959 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep., Journal Entry No. 6079, at 520.
95 1960 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep., Journal Entry No. 6191, at 533.
96 The scope of this study has not included the internal operations of the Corporation Commission or other purely procedural aspects of Oklahoma motor carrier regulation. Nevertheless, several comments appear to be at least worthy of a
footnote. Serious problems stem from the shortage of staff able to carry on the
research which is a necessary complement to good transport regulation. If staff
members are continuously tied up with day-to-day operating problems such as processing permit applications and insurance liability bonds, they can scarcely find
time to consolidate and analyze information about the status of the Oklahoma motor
carrier industry. Although the filing of annual financial reports and tariffs of all
intrastate motor carriers is required by law, the Commission's files of these include
considerably less than full industry coverage. Until August, 1964, when the Commission's Motor Carrier Division published unofficial lists of carriers and their
authorities, such information was available only at the files of the Commission.
The unhappy state of the Commission's annual reports makes it extremely difficult
to indentify the course which policy is taking. Consideration should be given to
reorganizing the format of that document along topical rather than temporal lines.
A little editing and consolidation might also permit the publishing of the general
rules of the Corporation Commission regarding motor carriers in a form which
truckers and shippers could easily understand. A step in the right direction is
found in the Commission's publication in June, 1964 of a little booklet containing
Order No. 15,639 and related orders and journal entries affecting motor carriers.
Furthermore, it sometimes occurs that Commission orders, in a strict legal sense,
do not become effective because lack of funds prevents their publication in an
Oklahoma County newspaper once a week for at least four consecutive weeks. OxLA.
CoNsT. ART. 9, § 18.
93

Rules of practice and procedure in motor carrier cases before the Commission
recently drawn up by Mr. Charles Ham and proposed in Cause No. 22,847 represent a very desirable step toward developing an intelligible technique for dealing with complex and conflicting policy issues. It should always be remembered
that the quality of economic regulation tends to vary directly with the quality of
administration and administrative procedure. For an early, brief analysis of the
functions of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission see The Brookings Institution,

Organizationand Administrasion of Oklahoma, 178-83 (1935).
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roles affecting the relationship between private and for-hire intrastate
motor freight transportation. As practice develops over the years, there
also develops an understandable reluctance to change practice. Plenty of
regulatory and judicial revision of a rather unclear statute has resulted in
a framework of law and regulation which may be described as tolerably
workable. Nevertheless, failure to evaluate carefully the sorts of measures
consistent with the public interest, and indeed to identify what is the
public interest, can lead to disastrous results in a field where regulated
frims ferquently face direct competition from firms free of regulation.
MOTOR CARRIER TAXATION
The Oklahoma vehicle-mile tax in efect from 1923 to 1939 probably stimulated private trucking because it automatically meant a cost
differential between private and for-hire operations. At first it was not
dear whether the tax applied at all to private carriers; later collection of
the tax was implemented much more effectively against Class A than
other trucks. However, it is difficult to see how Oklahoma's present motor
vehicle tax system has any differential impact on private as compared with
for-hire truckers. A flat, per-gallon fuel tax favors trucks which can prbduce high ton-miles per gallon of fuel Shippers frequently use private
trucking in situations where they can keep their equipment fully utilized,
while they rely on for-hire carriers to provide additional service required
during periods of peak traffic. On the other hand, private truckers prohibited from soliciting business of other shippers may be engaged in
considerable empty back-hauling.
LIMTS ON OPERATING AuTHoRiTy
The blessing of protection of property rights in operating authority
at times may turn into a bane because it reduces carriers' ability to provide flexible service needed by some shippers. Oklahoma manufacturing
firms using private trucks surveyed by the author frequently noted inadequate service by for-hire carriers as a cause for their use of their own or
leased trucks. 9 7 To the extent that they compete with more specialized
97 A total of 140 questionnaires were sent to all Oklahoma manufacturing
plants employing 50 or more workers listed in the State Dep't. of Commerce and
Industry's Directory of Oklahotm Manufacturers for 1959. Shippers using private
trcking were asked to identify causes for such use. A list of 10 commonly mentioned reasons for private trucking was provided, and the shippers checked reasons
important to them. A shipper could check as many of the reasons on the list as he
desired. Of the 81 replies received, 38 indicated some use of private trucking. The
results were as follows:
Reason
Number of Times Chockod
Need for flexibility in your transportation service
26
For-hire carrier rates too high
23
Slow delivery by for-hire carriers
19
Special equipment not available
11
Irregularity of service by for-hire carriers
8
Control over drivers and labor problems
8
Carriers without necessary operating authority
7
Carrier indifference to your needs
7
Loss and damage problems
4
Inability to achieve loadable minimums
1
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Class B and private operations, Oklahoma Class A carriers may be faced
with a major dilemma regarding their inability to provide tailor-made
service for particular shippers.
On the other hand, the Commission's unwillingness to utilize the
same standards of convenience and necessity in the case of Class B contract as for common carriers has deterred the growth of private trucking.
High barriers to entry in Class B operations would probably result in
greatly expanded private carriage in Oklahoma, because private carrier
operations are much more similar to operations covered by Class B than
Class A authorities. It is possible that the Commission's liberal policy
toward the Class B authority may at times endanger the economic health
of Class A carriers whose public responsibility is somewhat more dearly
defined. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that there is a high degree
of competition between Class B and private trucking, and that more restrictive policy toward Class B authority might not successfully protect
the positions of existing Class A and B carriers. Awareness of this competitive relationship with private carriage may be more important than
in the past, for there appears to be a tendency for applications for Class
B authority to carry oil field equipment, petroleum products, and household goods to be hotly contested before the Commission.
There is need to revise portions of the Oklahoma Statutes dealing
with motor carrier operating rights in order to make them consistent with
existing practice. Particularly unclear are the provisions relating to the
tests which the Corporation Commission is to use in judging whether or
not to grant certificates and permits. The Commission has used the
statute's Class B permits to handle both irregular route common carriers
and contract operations. While the former are subject to a convenience
and necessity test, the latter are not. Several other states and the federal
government use a two-fold system of classification in which all regulated
operations involve either contract or common carriage. Such a system
might permit a more cogent statement of legislative intent regarding
criteria for entry of new for-hire motor transport services. The 1961
Corporation Commission order stating standards to be used in judging
applications for contract permits is a desirable policy clarification and
indicates a posible direction for statutory revision"
It might also be desirable to remove from the statutes any reference
to the requirement that Class C carriers obtain permits from the Corporation Commission. Such provisions are part of the statutes only because
they developed as adjuncts to the now-extinct vehicle-mile tax, and they
have been dead letters for years.
RATE, RoUTE AND SERVICE POLICY
Too high rates and inadequate service of for-hire carriers are fre0s 1961 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep., Order No. 44,935, at 396.
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quent causes for Oklahoma manufacturing firms using their own or
leased trucks. Pressure arising from protection of for-hire carrier revenues
through discriminatory non-competitive rate structures and limitation of
entry is always regulated by the escape valve of private trucking. A further
outlet is frequently offered by illegal for-hire operations. The availability
of these shipper escapes from regulated for-hire transport means market
forces pushing for-hire carrier rates close to average total costs for particular commodity flows. Although thorough law enforcement can prevent
much illegal transport, considerable carrier freedom of action is necessary
as long as private trucking is unregulated.9 9 Complete freedom, however,
disregards important conditions initially leading to regulation-particularly the provision of comon carrier service so important to the shipping
public. The regulatory authority must steer its rate and service policy on
a careful course between the Scylla of restriction promoting the growth
of uneconomical private or illegal trucking and the Charybdis of erosion
of the legal responsibility of the common carrier. Hazardous though this
course may be, its navigation can be facilitated by better knowledge and
clarification of policy goals.
It is possible that the pressure necessary to activate the escape valve
of private or illegal trucking is frequently misjudged by regulatory agencies and the for-hire carriers themselves. This is partially the inevitable
result of the unfortunate status of quantitative knowledge concerning the
extent and nature of for-hire and private trucking. Little information on
such matters as costs, capacity, volume of business, and specific commodity flows is available relating to the for-hire segment of the Oklahoma motor carrier industry; virtually nothing is known about the private
segment.100 It is interesting to note that Oklahoma has frequently led the
way for other oil producing states in the field of the regulation of the
99 The argument over whether federal regulation should promote greater price
competition among regulated carriers has generated considerable analysis and pre.
scription. For a lengthy defense of detailed rate regulation see U. S. Senate, Comm.
on Commerce, op. cit. supra. Recent reports flowing from the executive branch
recommend greater reliance on the free market in setting transport prices. Presiden.
tial Advisory Committee on Transport Policy and Organization, Revision of Paderal TransportationPolicy, a Report of the President (1955); U. S. Dep't. of

Commerce, Federal Transportation Policy and Program, (1960); U. S. House of
Representatives, Message from the President of the United States Relative to the
Transportation System of Our Nation, H. R. Doc. No. 384, 87th Cong., 2d Sess
(1962). Additional support for rate freedom may be found in Roberts, The Regulation of Transport Price Competition, 24 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 557 (1959);
NELSON, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY, The Brookings Institution (1959); and Meyer, et al., ThE EcONOmiCS Op COMPETITION IN THE

(1959).
100 The 1963 Census of Transportation promises to disclose much hitherto unavailable data about all aspects of the transportation industries. Unfortunately, the
area reports applying to Oklahoma have not been published at this writing. For an
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES,

analysis of 1958 traffic patterns of Oklahoma Class A carriers see CONSTANTIN,
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producing sector of the petroleum industry. This could scarcely be true
if as little data were available about the structure of the Oklahoma oil industry as is the case in motor trucking.
The absence of current factual information automatically forces the
regulatory body upon the undesirable course of relying upon criteria developed in the past. There is, for instance, no economic justification for a
minimum rate policy based upon a set of rates determined twenty years
ago. Yet that is exactly what the Corporation Commission has implied in
its recent Grandfield rate decision. 10 1
Clarification of policy goals should go hand in hand with the building of a firm factual foundation upon which to base policy decisions. The
rapid relative growth of private trucking in recent years suggests the
need to reconsider the nature of the legal obligations bound up in common carriage. It may be necessary for regulated carriers to offer more
specialized services at rates more closely related to the costs which a
private trucker would incur' 02 However, the "specialization" of "common" carriers is a contradition in terms implying a possible undesirable
impact upon the shipping public in general and the small shipper in
particular. The horns of this dilemma are placed in bold relief by the
recent "dedicated service" case.' 0 3 The arrangement in that case was much
more closely akin to contract carriage or equipment leasing than to common carriage. This was undoubtedly one factor leading the Commission
to disallow it as Class B common carriage. Yet some such special arrangements may be absolutely necessary in order for for-hire carriers to stem
the tide of private trucking.
SUMMARY
A review of the history and administration of Oklahoma motor carrier law indicates conditions promoting as well as discouraging the growth
of private and unregulated trucking. The net impact of regulation is difficult to evaluate. It is possible, however, that some clarification and revision of the framework of Oklahoma motor carrier regulation might
have a beneficial effect on the organization of the state's motor transportation system. Important though the legal milieu may be, it must always
be remembered that the basic responsibility for innovation in a privatelyowned transportation system lies with those engaged in the business of
transportation.
101 1960 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Ann. Rep., Order No. 41,111, at 321, supra at

30.
102 William H. Dodge and Richard Carll, after a painstaking study of carrier
and shipper positions in a California general rate increase case, concluded that
socially desirable California minimum rate regulation should permit rate differences reflecting differences in the specific cost of handling different commodities
and shipments under varying traffic conditions. The influence of Proprietary Trucking upon Minimum Rate Policy in California, 11 VAND. L REV. 1109 (1958).
102 Okla. Corp. Comm'n. Order No. 48,971 (typewritten copy). See supra at 26.
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